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Abstract: Peter Howitt is best known for his contributions to growth theory, but his work in shortrun economics, which began with his Ph.D thesis and still continues, is important and deserves
attention. It lies firmly in the Keynesian macro-disequilibrium tradition of Clower and
Leijonhufvud, and for a long time has been overshadowed by New-classical and New-Keynesian
orthodoxy. However, the development of agent based modelling and behavioural economics will
perhaps give disequilibrium macroeconomics a new lease on life.
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*This paper formed the basis of a presentation made at L’Universite Cote d’Azur, Nice, on September 8 2022 as part
of a Doctorat Honoris Causa Ceremony honouring Peter Howitt. My debt to personal correspondence with Peter is
immense. Nevertheless the view of his contribution to short-run macroeconomics that I set out here is entirely my
own responsibility.
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I Introduction
It is a great honour and an even greater pleasure to discuss some of Peter Howitt’s contributions
to macroeconomics. I had heard praise of Peter from Bob Clower even before we became
colleagues in 1975, and though he left the University of Western Ontario long ago, we have
never lost touch with each other. We have written only one paper together, and an obscure one at
that (Howitt and Laidler 1979), but our association has been much deeper and longer lasting than
this statistic might suggest. It has been one of the most fruitful of my career. Peter’s
contributions to short-run macroeconomics (hereafter just “macroeconomics”) attract far less
attention than those to growth theory, and far less than they deserve. This is surely because they
have been unfashionably Keynesian. Fashion can change, though, and this brief essay explains
why it should and still might.1
II The Keynesian Recovery that Wasn’t but Still Might Be.
I shall start my story towards its middle, on May 29th, 1986, to be precise, when Peter delivered
the annual Harold Innis Lecture to the Canadian Economic Association’s Winnipeg conference.
His title was “The Keynesian Recovery” (Howitt 1986b): pointed and provocative, given the
recent dominance of the ideas of New Classical Economics (NCE) over academic
macroeconomics. The lecture’s message was: that Keynesian Economics, whose demise had
been proclaimed by Robert E. Lucas Jr. and Thomas J. Sargent (1978) just a few years earlier,
was showing renewed vigour at a time when NCE was beginning to weaken in the face of
empirical evidence; that it still provided the soundest basis for the sub-discipline’s future
development; and that it would soon regain its dominance. And he used the same title a little
later for a collection of his essays on short-run macro topics (Howitt 1990a).
As we all know, despite this display of persistent optimism, Peter’s third proposition turned out
to be far off the mark, leaving the other two moot. Mainstream macroeconomics did not reestablish itself on reconstructed Keynesian foundations in the 1980s. Instead, it maintained
continuity with NCE and entered a long phase of what a Kuhnian would call “normal science,”
going on to develop a body of analysis, occasionally characterized as the New Neo Classical
Synthesis (NNCS), whose only link to Keynesian economics lay in the perversely misleading
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And with brevity comes selectivity. It should be said explicitly that this essay does not purport to be a complete
survey of Peter’s work in macroeconomics. In particular, the emphasis here is on his contributions to our
understanding of the role of monetary exchange in short-run systems. In the ‘80s, he also made significant
contributions to the search theoretic literature that followed the lead of Peter Diamond (1982a&b), exploiting thennew equilibrium concepts derived from game theory (see Howitt 1985, Howitt and McAfee 1987, 1988). In my view
and from the perspective of Peter’s own work, these are best seen as technical precursors of his contributions to
growth theory, where the deployment of similar equilibrium concepts is fundamental. With the sole exception of
Howitt (1988), he did not try to follow up their substance in the context of a money-using economy. See also
footnote 13 below. As Clerc and Raymond dos Santos-Ferreira (this symposium) recount, however, a distinctive
non-Walrasian, but also non-monetary, type of short-run macroeconomics, has developed from the search-theoretic
foundations laid in the 1980s.
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“New-Keynesian” (NK) label that has more usually been applied to it in recent years.2 In the real
world, memories of the Volcker disinflation faded as the ‘80s progressed (the severity of
Canada’s downturn in the early ‘90s was a local phenomenon), medium term inflation targeting
was widely adopted in the ‘90s in preference to the pursuit of short run stabilization goals, the
Great Moderation set in, and, in Western economies at least (Asia and Russia were different
matters), the macroeconomic environment remained tranquil for almost two decades.
When this peaceful era came to an abrupt end with the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the
recessions that followed, it turned out that NNCS/NKE had surprisingly little to say about these
events. And before the sub-discipline had caught its intellectual breath, the widespread and stillongoing inflation that followed the policy-improvisations prompted by the arrival of the
coronavirus pandemic in 2020 faced it with a new set of inflationary challenges to which it once
again failed to rise. Perhaps, then, as Peter himself hopes, the Keynesian Recovery that he looked
forward to so long ago might only have been delayed for three or four decades: hence the title of
this essay.
III A Keynesian Education that Definitely Was
Peter’s education in macroeconomics was robustly Keynesian, and very different from that to
which Robert E. Lucas Jr. (2004) would attach the same label when describing his own training
in early ‘60s Chicago.3 In the late ‘60s there were still important economics departments where
the textbook based “standard curriculum” had not penetrated, where graduate students were few
and far between, and where the later stages of the undergraduate programme provided the venue
where faculty took students to those parts of the subject’s frontiers that particularly interested
them. McGill was such a place. The macro component of Peter’s final honours B.A. year (196768) saw him working through not one of the numerous texts based on the Samuelson-Hansen
Neoclassical Synthesis (NCS) and centered on the ubiquitous IS-LM diagram, but The General
Theory itself, as well as the second edition of Don Patinkin’s Money Interest and Prices, under
the guidance of Joan Robinson’s student Tom Asimakopulos and of Tom’s other mentor, Jack
Weldon.
His next stop, the one-year M.A. program at the University of Western Ontario was more
conventional, but it nevertheless included a one semester course in monetary economics taught
by Joel Fried, a recent student of Clower. At Western, Peter was thus exposed (among other
things, of course) to Clower’s (1965) “Keynesian counter-revolution” paper, which along with
2

The New Keynesian label was first applied in the late 1970s to models that relied on sticky prices to generate their
results. The aggregate demand sides of later models, whose supply sides were based on Real Business Cycle
analysis, were directly descended from these, and brought this label along with them. By the late 1990s the NNCS
and NKE labels were being used synonymously.
3
Lucas received this education mainly from Martin Bailey, author of the fine (1962) textbook National Income and
the Price Level, and Harry Johnson, the outline of whose course followed quite closely that of his once famous
(1962) “Survey of Monetary Theory”. Joan Robinson, the mentor of Peter’s teacher Tom Asimakopoulos would
surely have applied her famous qualifier “bastard” to the version of “Keynesianism” represented here.
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Chapter XIII of Patinkin would in due course provide the basis for Robert Barro and Herschel
Grossman’s (1971) “General Disequilibrium Model of Income and Employment”. And it was
while at Western that he bought his copy of Axel Leijonhufvud’s (1968) On Keynesian
Economics and the Economics of Keynes. Small wonder that, in 1969, his preferred destination
for a Ph.D. was Northwestern, with Clower as his thesis supervisor, or that when, having
followed Clower to Los Angeles in 1971 to complete that thesis, he “thought he had gone to
heaven” when he found himself a member of a group that included not only Clower, but
Leijonhufvud and Joseph Ostroy as well.4
IV Macroeconomics in Disarray 1972
Peter absorbed this education at a time when there was much disarray in macroeconomics.5 In
1972, when he took up his first academic appointment back at the University of Western Ontario,
the extent to which Hansen’s (1954) Guide to Keynes had ever described a useful route to
understanding The General Theory was still under debate, but its claims here had already been
subject to much skeptical scrutiny. The NCS that Hansen had helped codify around the IS-LM
framework, and had formed the basis of Lucas’s education, was spawning ever larger and more
complex and disaggregated macro-econometric models, but gave no guidance to anyone wishing
to link macroeconomic to microeconomic theory. Patinkin’s (1956) Money, Interest and Prices,
whose first edition appeared only two years after Hansen’s textbook, had tried to remedy this
deficiency. Its subtitle, it is worth recalling, was An Integration of Monetary and Value Theory.
Keynes’s own discussions of the micro-foundations of his General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money were opaque, thanks to that book’s Marshallian pedigree, and the subsequent
absorption of formal General Equilibrium Theory in the tradition of Walras and Pareto into the
English language literature, following the efforts of John Hicks (1939), Paul Samuelson (1947),
and eventually Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954), had not eliminated the challenges
posed by this opacity. As I recall Clower putting it sometime in the mid-‘60s, the Walrasian
model consisted of a set of equations describing the entire economy, all of which had quantities
on their left-hand side and prices on the right and yielded a full employment equilibrium
solution; the algebraic representation of what should have been that same economy summarised
in IS-LM , had quantities on the right hand side of some of its equations, and yielded a full
employment solution only by remote accident: why the different configuration of these
equations, and how was this related to their different solutions? What further issues might an
answer to these questions raise?6

4

Personal correspondence with Peter Howitt 14/06/22. In his oral presentation at this conference, Peter also
included Armen Alchian on this list.
5
My appropriation of the title of Karl Brunner’s (1986, published 1989) Henry Thornton Lecture, to which the
profession paid insufficient attention, is deliberate. His use of it to describe the state of this unruly sub-discipline in
the early 80s is equally apt when applied to the beginning of the ‘70s.
6
It is not co-incidental that Clower was Hicks’ student. Hicks’ own half century of intellectual progress from J.R
Hicks, author of Value and Capital (1939), and originator (1937) of the IS-LM diagram (which he labelled SI-LL) to
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As we all know nowadays, the answers here turned on the fact that an “auctioneer” presided over
the Walrasian economy. Only when this entity had found a set of prices that cleared all markets,
communicated them to all agents, and arranged all necessary contacts among them for
multilateral barter exchange to take place did economic activity begin. Thus, agents had all the
information needed to make mutually consistent plans as well as complete assurance that, when
it came to their execution, their co-ordination would be costless, before anyone actually did
anything.
The Keynesian economy, on the other hand, lacked an auctioneer, and required agents to cope
with such problems for themselves. They had somehow to set prices, disseminate information
about them, devise ways to find others with whom trade would be possible and desirable, and
then try to harmonise the outcomes of each individual bilateral transaction with all the others,
etc. etc.. In this Keynesian economy, which bears a remarkable resemblance to the one we
actually inhabit, acts of sale and purchase would be executed sequentially rather than
simultaneously, and hence would be conditioned by expectations about what was coming next.
Crucially, they would also be facilitated by the use of some universally acceptable intermediate
item.
Money or, more precisely, the institution of monetary exchange, was thus understood to be as
essential to this Keynesian economy as were the activities of the auctioneer to its Walrasian
counterpart. Indeed the two performed essentially the same tasks in the competing systems. The
auctioneer was much better at them, though, being able to ensure that all trades took place at
market clearing prices in a system of frictionless multilateral barter. On the other hand, in the
non-Walrasian system, trades of goods and services against money might be executed at nonmarket-clearing - “false” - prices, rendering the execution of previously formulated plans
impossible. Agents would thus need to devise rules to cope with such eventualities, apply them,
and try again . . . and again . . . The presence of quantities in those Keynesian equations that had
attracted Clower’s attention turned out to follow from this last insight, as did the likelihood, so
thoroughly laid out by Leijonhufvud (1968), that their presence could create dynamic adjustment
processes that would amplify, rather than damp down, the consequences of any initial shocks or
errors.
By 1972, explorations of the consequences of these insights, notably by Barro and Grossman
(1971), and various contributors to Edmund Phelps (ed.) (1970), were in full swing, though the
super-structure of this style of Keynesian economics was by no means as complete as that of the
IS-LM centered NCS which it was now challenging. And to complicate the intellectual
environment further, in (1970) Milton Friedman had at last explicitly declared his Monetarist
“Counter-revolution in Macroeconomics” against those same mainstream ideas. This insurgency
had been in progress for some years and was mainly based on empirical and policy related, rather
John Hicks, author (with constant encouragement from Axel Leijonhufvud) of A Market theory of Money (1989)
was an important part of the story of the evolution of Keynesian macroeconomics.
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than micro-theoretic analysis. Friedman himself had earlier suggested that the intellectual space
in which it was taking place had previously been occupied by a pre-General Theory version of
the Quantity Theory of Money, though some were suggesting that, particularly in his treatment
of the demand for money, Friedman was in fact encroaching on Keynesian territory.7
V The Appealing New Classical Simplification
Be that as it may, when Peter took up his first academic appointment in 1972, no school of
thought dominated his chosen field of study, and no-one was quite sure if or how all the abovementioned pieces fitted together. But in that same year the Journal of Economic Theory
published a brief and technically difficult paper on “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money”
by Robert E. Lucas Jr.
This paper’s contents are too well known to require repetition. What matters here is that, at first,
almost no-one noticed its particularly destructive significance for the still incomplete Keynesian
agenda, on which work therefore continued.8 Two of its features in particular were attracting
critical attention at the time: namely, its apparent implication that a market economy would be
extremely unlikely ever to achieve and maintain full employment without the continuous help of
activist policy aimed at that outcome; and its relative neglect of price level fluctuations.9 The
need to attend to these was pressing because, in the real world, high employment had in fact
persisted everywhere for almost a quarter century and was now being accompanied by rising and
increasingly conspicuous inflation.
Peter had already worked on the price level in the chapter in his thesis that became his 1974 JPE
paper “Stability and The Quantity Theory”. There he had shown how the awkward and totally
contrived separation of the determination by an auctioneer of the price level from the processes
of market exchange that had marked Patinkin’s exposition of the Walrasian microeconomics of
the real balance effect could be eliminated by considering a Keynesian set up in which money
prices were set and varied by “shop-keepers” in response to sales of their wares.10 This paper’s
7

See Patinkin (1974). As to monetarism’s more general Keynesian connection, the largely independent work of Karl
Brunner and Allan Meltzer, both of whom had strong UCLA connections, on the place of money in the economics
of information, surely confirms it. See Brunner (1971), Brunner and Meltzer (1971) and Pierrick Clerc (2019, 2022)
8
And of course its significance extended far beyond this particular matter. See Laidler (2022). Furthermore,
“almost no-one” is not everyone. Crucially for the future development of New Classical Economics, Thomas J.
Sargent and Neil Wallace grasped the significance of Lucas’s paper even before it was published. See Sargent
(2021)
9
Because this analysis mainly focussed on the forces producing the variations in real variables that had so occupied
Keynes in (1936), and because these stemmed from trading at non-market clearing prices, it was all too convenient
to simplify matters by assuming that prices were constant, as did, for example Barro and Grossman (1971). This
author can attest personally to the increasing difficulty of getting some of his Manchester students to take such
models seriously as inflation rose to well over 20 per cent per annum.
10
Patinkin’s analysis in effect left the auctioneer to set prices but deprived him of the task of then bringing trading
partners together. This completely arbitrary adjustment to the usual Walrasian arrangements left room for the
emergence of a precautionary demand for money. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) would later utilize the same analytic
contrivance in the development of their search theoretic analysis of the emergence of monetary exchange, as Peter
long ago pointed out to me.
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very title, never mind its content, made it clear that Keynesian theory could support an
explanation of price level behaviour in terms of variations in the money supply just as easily as
could Monetarism, no minor point at a time when most exponents of NCS Keynesianism were
favouring cost-push explanations of inflation and denying the relevance of money to its progress.
As to the task of reconciling analysis initially intended to explain chronic unemployment to the
fact of persistently high employment, Leijonhufvud’s (1973) “Effective Demand Failures”
suggested that the non-Walrasian monetary economy might well have an equilibrium solution in
the vicinity of full employment which lay within a corridor. Here deviation-damping
mechanisms would dominate output’s response to disturbances, but outside of this zone, these
might be overwhelmed by deviation-amplifying processes. Once within this corridor, whether as
the result of chance or sound policies, the economy would tend to stay put, as it in fact had in the
post-war years, unless and until it was hit by a large enough shock to push it into unstable
territory. Typical of Axel’s style, this paper was longer on theoretical vision than on the hard
analysis needed to convince skeptical readers. Peter provided the latter in (1978), along with
references to the work of other scholars who had explored similar ideas (these included Irving
Fisher 1933, and Hyman Minsky 1964).
The Leijonhufvud-Howitt “corridor” papers between them had the potential to provide a
jumping-off point for the exploration of the inflationary consequences (whose destructive nature
Axel himself laid out with great originality in 1977) of positive destabilising shocks, and hence
to lay the foundations for a Keynesian alternative (or supplement - which was not clear) to
contemporary Monetarist analysis of inflation. But they didn’t. Between their publication dates,
Keynesian macroeconomics had lost most of its readership as macroeconomists realised that
Lucas had shown that the (admittedly complicated) non-Walrasian micro-foundations that Axel
and Peter were taking the lead in developing were unnecessary for the explanation of fluctuations
in real variables. This understanding took hold, moreover, just as it was also becoming apparent
that the best known Keynesian macro-model of the time, that of Barro and Grossman (1971,
extended in 1976), was leading not forward into new territory, but back to a structure not much
different from the traditional fixed price-level IS-LM set up, while also yielding the grossly false
prediction that, if a condition of excess aggregate demand ever developed, output and
employment would fall.
Barro and Grossman themselves would be among the first of many to conclude that Keynesian
macroeconomics was not only more complex than was required, but also less productive of
useful results than was desirable, and to abandon it for NCE, which also attracted many recruits
from the Monetarist camp. NCE’s Walrasian nature made it incapable of incorporating the
institution of monetary exchange, so that it could treat “money” only as some sort of store of
value.11 Despite this awkward fact, however, it also seemed to many to provide a coherent micro11

Hence the importance of overlapping generations models of money in the NCE literature. It is true that some of its
exponents, notably Lucas himself in (1984), sometimes incorporated Clower’s (1967) “cash in advance” constraint
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theoretic basis for the increasingly persuasive claims that Monetarism was making about the
empirical importance of monetary shocks in driving price level behaviour, the essentially
transitory nature of their effects on real variables, and (particularly as further elaborated by
Lucas himself (1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1976) the futility of discretionary stabilisation
policies, particularly those guided by econometric models. In 1981, James Tobin would rename
NCE “Monetarism Mark 2”, and frame the macroeconomic debate as one between NCS, which
he still defended, and NCE. Many people (including Peter 1986, but not this author 1981) found
this renaming appropriate enough, but few shared Peter’s continuing belief that his brand of
Keynesianism also had something to contribute to the debate in question.
VI Empirical Complications
NCE, in the form that Lucas and Sargent (1978) promoted it, quickly came under pressure, both
theoretical and empirical. To begin with, though it certainly provided a rigorous theoretical basis
for Friedman’s (1968) claims that systematic variations in the behaviour of the money supply
could have no effects on real variables, its manner of doing so seemed a bit too simple.
Specifically, it was quickly noted that it would not hold up if some feature or features of the
economy led to agents collecting, processing, and/or acting on less information that NCE
claimed would inform their expectations.
One obvious barrier here was money wage stickiness, a prominent feature of real-world labour
markets and a phenomenon that had long been utilized by NCS to explain the occurrence of
unemployment. Papers by Stanley Fischer (1977) and Phelps and John Taylor (1977) duly
deployed it to show that, thus modified, otherwise NCE models yielded predictable results about
the potential effectiveness of activist monetary policy, thus giving what evolved into NKE its
start, not to mention its problematic label.12 In addition, costs of gathering and processing
information, staple ingredients of Keynesianism, were also quickly invoked to explain why
agents might not make use of all that was available when it came to forming what Edgar Feige
and James Pearce (1976) called “economically rational expectations.” Exponents of NCE,
initially remained unimpressed by all of these criticisms, and some of them, (e.g., Barro 1979)
even refused to discuss any results based on such phenomena unless their patently obvious

into their models – a notable act of intellectual larceny – but this procedure completely violated their own analytic
principle that everything in a model should follow from its own economic fundamentals, so the practice did not
catch on. To the best of my knowledge, the extensive literature that followed on from Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)
never took the all-important step of involving the institution of monetary exchange in the price formation process.
12
The problem being that, whatever the textbooks of the time, based on NCS, might have said, Keynes himself had
denied that what he called involuntary unemployment was the consequence of price stickiness. It might also be
noted that, with the arrival of NCE, the phrase “price flexibility” had changed its meaning, and so therefore had its
opposite “price stickiness”. Before 1972 the first phrase referred to prices that would move quickly to eliminate a
disequilibrium between supply and demand and the second to prices that took longer to adjust. After 1972, the
“price flexibility” that NCE assumed involved prices that moved so quickly as to endure that a disequilibrium never
arose in the first place, and anything short of that became “price stickiness.” See Laidler (1996).
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empirical existence had been explicitly deduced from “first principles” that met New Classical
criteria of soundness.
Peter’s (1980) paper “Activist Monetary Policy under Rational Expectations” can be read as a
response to this challenge. He analysed explicitly maximising individual behaviour in a many
agent economy where, as in Howitt (1974), money prices were set at the beginning of a trading
period by shop-keepers.13 He then formally showed that if it was at all costly to extract
information from publicly available money-supply data that might in principle help in individual
pricing decisions, one agent’s choice of whether actually to do so would depend upon, among
other things, an assessment of how other agents would tackle the same decision. If others seemed
unlikely to go to the trouble of absorbing and acting on such information, then going it alone
would yield no benefits, and, though available, it would be ignored by everyone. More generally,
Peter argued, whether and/or how the collection and utilisation of information was co-ordinated
across agents would affect how they utilised it; so indeed would the state of their information
about other aspects of the economy’s structure, which NCE models usually assumed, with no
justification beyond analytic convenience, to be complete.
By the time this paper appeared, more than just NCE’s policy ineffectiveness propositions were
coming under critical scrutiny. Basic inconsistencies between its predictions and certain facts of
economic life that had long been recognised, but initially brushed off as likely to be resolved
with further technical work, were beginning to be taken seriously. Notably, it had long been
recognised that fluctuations in real variables systematically precede those in the price level and
that they also persist over time. The often informal analysis deployed by Monetarism Mark 1 had
been tailored to fit these properties of the economy (see, e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963), but
the Lucas model had real variables responding along an aggregate supply curve to variations in
the price level, and only if these were unanticipated as well, while its configuration also ensured
that the price-level/relative-price-confusions that underlay such responses could only last for one
period.
The first of these awkward issues was inherent in the very properties of a perfectly competitive
economy in which an auctioneer sets prices before economic activity begins, and though Lucas
(1975) himself tried to address the second by stretching out the dissemination of price
information across the islands of his model economy to multiple periods, this solution turned out
to work only in the absence of economy wide asset markets.14 The econometric troubles implicit
here duly became explicit, first with Lucas’s own early (1973) resort to ad hoc adjustment lags in
13

In (1988) Peter would stray from this approach to the analysis of price level determination and consider a system
in which a Lucasian aggregate supply function played a central role. This paper was concerned with investigating
the consequences of explicitly incorporating a labour market characterised by search behaviour, as developed in
Howitt and McAfee (1987), into a macro model that otherwise followed new classical precepts, in order to show
how such considerations could lead to persistent employment fluctuations without resort to arbitrary wage and price
stickiness assumptions. This effort was successful in its own terms but proved to be a detour in the development of
his Keynesian approach to short-run macro modelling. See also footnote 1, above.
14
See Edi Karni (1980) for a formal presentation of the argument.
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the explanation of output fluctuations, more conspicuously with the tortured compromises
between theory and evidence that marked Robert J. Barro’s (1978) efforts to fit a small
econometric version of it to post-war US data, and then, decisively, with John Boschen and
Grossman’s (1981) demonstration (which confirmed but did not cite Peter’s (1980) predictions)
that variations in readily and immediately available data on the US money supply were not used
to form inflation expectations, and were in fact systematically and strongly related to subsequent,
highly serially correlated, variations in real output. Initial reporting errors in these series,
moreover, which measured variations in the money supply that could not have been anticipated,
had no discernable influence at all on anything.
VII More Disarray Followed by Simplification Resurgent
By the early ‘80s, then, it was clear that Lucas’s (1972) money-supply-surprise model had failed
in the face of empirical evidence. And fairly or not, its reputation had also been damaged by a
bad dose of guilt by association with the Volcker disinflation, which had been widely touted as a
failure of Monetarism of both Marks.15 NCS too, and particularly the big econometric models
associated with it, had already sustained severe damage from earlier theoretical attacks on their
foundations, as well as from their perceived association with the macroeconomic policies that
had brought on and then failed to curb the inflation that Volcker’s policies had brought to a
painful end. Thus, it suddenly seemed as if the Keynesian approach to macroeconomics was the
only one not in serious trouble, that its recent eclipse might have been temporary, and that the
field was wide-open for that Keynesian Recovery. In the circumstances, the timing of the
publication of Axel’s Information and Co-ordination in (1981) and Peter’s review article
discussing it in Economic Inquiry (1984) seemed perfect. So, what happened?
To begin with, Real Business Cycle Theory (RBC) arrived with the 1982 publication in
Econometrica of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s “Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations” and proved immediately attractive to those many exponents of NCE for whom its
main virtue had been the equilibrium modelling idea and the techniques that went with it. RBC
provided a new and extensive agenda where they could continue to exercise their methodological
preferences. Perhaps, had it not turned up, some of them might eventually have been tempted to
look at a Keynesian menu for new research topics. But it did, so the barriers to such a temptation
were never seriously tested.
In the meanwhile, NKE had also continued to develop and attract the attention of those more
interested in empirical content and policy implications than theory for its own sake. Its early
pragmatic adoption of ad hoc price stickiness was in due course replaced by the incorporation of
monopolistically competitive pricing, while its relatively unfastidious attitude towards other ad
hoc fixes that might increase its empirical content permitted it to deal with persistence by
unashamedly resorting to adjustment lags in the style of Lucas (1973). At a time when the
15

To be clear, this author, like Karl Brunner (1983), is firmly on the “not” side in this debate, but there is no space
here to discuss the reasons why.
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search was on for a new “place to stand” for monetary policy in the wake of money growth
targeting’s failures, NKE found a ready audience, particularly among those who had never lost
their suspicions of Monetarism during its short period of ascendency.16 And NKE’s ability to
accommodate the ancient argument that the money supply’s movements represent passive
endogenous responses to factors affecting the economy’s demand for it, rather than playing any
causative role in their determination, only served to make it even more attractive in those
quarters.
Even so, Peter made a considerable effort to promote a more thoroughgoing Keynesian
foundation for monetary policy analysis in his Monetary Policy in Transition: a Study of Bank of
Canada Policy 1982-85 (1986a). Here, his practical recommendation was that the Bank should
develop and then adopt a system that he called “adaptive monetary control”. Its goal would be to
attain and then maintain price stability by putting and then keeping the growth of money (a
broader aggregate rather than the narrow one that had caused so much trouble in the ‘70s) within
a limited range by systematically varying the Bank’s policy interest rate in response to any
incipient tendency for it to go off track.
This focus on interest rate control differentiated Peter’s proposal quite sharply from
contemporary monetarist work, where the monetary base remained the preferred policy
instrument. Indeed, if we were to substitute the inflation rate for the money growth rate here, it
would look very much like a quantitatively less precise anticipation of the quintessentially New
Keynesian Taylor Rule. But Peter also explicitly argued, in this monograph and elsewhere, that
claims about the passive endogeneity of money that were becoming a prominent feature of NKE
were wrong.17 More generally, his Keynesian convictions about the vital importance of the
monetary and financial system for the successful co-ordination of economic activity were on full
display in this monograph as well, as they would be later in his essay on “Zero Inflation as a
Long Term Target for Monetary Policy” (Howitt 1990b).18 It was NKE’s failure to pay serious
attention to just these matters that would eventually render it so helpless in the face of the
financial turbulence that began in 2008 and of today’s inflation as well.
Peter’s policy work was both visible and influential in the local Canadian debate, but this success
did not extend to creating a significant readership for the theoretical work that lay behind it. In
Canada as elsewhere, monetary policy would in due course find its theoretical place to stand, not
in Keynesian economics, but in NNCS, a merger between NKE and RBC. The former, much
tightened up from its 1970s formulations by application of “representative agent” modelling
techniques, focussed on the influence of variations in the real value of a policy interest rate on
16

Monetary Policy: Finding A Place to Stand was the title that Governor Gerald K. Bouey chose for his 1982 Per
Jacobsson Lecture on central banks’ then ongoing search for new principles on which to base their policies in the
wake of Volcker disinflation and the alleged failure of monetarism that it had revealed.
17
This topic was discussed in our only joint paper, Howitt and Laidler (1979)
18
Keynesianism also marked this essay’s extensive dynamically framed cost-benefit analysis of inflation reduction
policies in the style of Phelps (1967, 1972)
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aggregate demand, while the latter accounted for the evolution, as determined by resource
endowments and productivity, of the economy’s “natural” output level. The resulting “output
gap” between these two variables, both of which were subject to random shocks, then affected
the time path of the inflation rate relative to its rationally expected value. The Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) analysis that was the product of this synthesis, having
adopted the NKE label, in due course came to dominate academic macroeconomics. As inflation
targeting programs proliferated in the 1990s, it also came to dominate the formulation of
monetary policy, as the all-embracing sub-title of Michael Woodford’s (2003) Interest and
Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy attests.
But representative agent economies in perpetual equilibrium cannot suffer from information and
co-ordination problems and they have no room for monetary exchange either, so Keynesian
economics was pushed yet again, and even further, towards the intellectual fringes by these
developments.
VIII Style Outweighs Substance
This is how things happened, but why did they develop in this way? Like Peter, I believe that the
answer here lies more in matters of style than of substance, in the persuasive rhetoric with which
equilibrium modelling was marketed from the very outset, rather than in the specifics, let alone
the accuracy and usefulness, of its empirical predictions. Peter paid particular attention to these
matters in his JEL review of Arjo Klamer’s (1984) Conversations with Economists (Howitt
1986c) and treated the weight that Klamer attached to rhetoric for its own sake with suspicion.
He agreed that NCE’s strictly deductivist methodology and equilibrium modelling techniques
were novel, attractive, and applicable to a wide range of questions, and that these stylistic
characteristics had done much to promote its popularity. But he also criticised Klamer for paying
insufficient attention to NCE’s shaky substantive content.
Now, an analytic method is separable from any particular model that conforms to it, so the rules
of inference require only that the latter be discarded in the face of contradictory evidence. From
the 1970s onwards, this consideration had underlain, as it still does, the specific claims made on
behalf of equilibrium modelling in macroeconomics that its analytic method, being just that, is
without specific empirical content, and that any criticisms of it based on the poor empirical
performance of particular models are therefore beside the point. If there were no more to the
matter than this, then Peter’s (1986c) criticism of Klamer would have to be dismissed as
irrelevant. But in Howitt (1990c) he would demonstrate that there was indeed more to it, that
equilibrium modeling actually prevented discussion of certain empirical issues, a factor even
more important than the veracity of the predictions that emerged from the discussions that it did
allow.
His working paper of that year, “Wicksell’s Cumulative Process as Non-Convergence to
Rational Expectations Equilibrium” developed an example of how this could happen. The
12

conceptual experiment he considered was one where, in a conventional NCE macro model, the
monetary authorities peg the nominal rate of interest, with the real rate of interest then being
subjected to a positive productivity shock. For the system to remain in equilibrium at a constant
nominal rate of interest, the expected rate of inflation had to fall to offset this positive shock.
Furthermore, if agents were forming their expectations rationally and considering only
equilibrium outcomes in doing so, they would read the maintenance of a constant nominal
interest rate as a statement of the monetary authorities’ intention to maintain this lower inflation
rate. So, the economy’s equilibrium response to the initial productivity shock would be an
immediate fall in this variable to its new equilibrium value.19 But, crucially, Peter then showed
that, if the requirement that equilibrium be constantly maintained was dropped from this
experiment, a positive productivity shock in the presence of a constant nominal interest rate
could instead open up a gap between the rate of interest that borrowers were willing to pay and
the one that lenders were charging. The resulting disequilibrium would then set in motion an
explosive Wicksellian cumulative process of inflation that would persist for as long as the
nominal interest rate remained pegged. This specific example had a general implication: namely,
that an insistence on continuously clearing markets can eliminate discussion of empirically
interesting, not to mention potentially accurate, predictions, and hence is not a scientifically
neutral method of analysis.
Peter’s paper was later published under a revised title in the highly visible JPE (Howitt 1992),
but equilibrium modelling went on its way, impervious to its implications. Perhaps this was not
surprising. After all, it had been well known long before 1992 that: the aggregate production
function that lay at the heart of the RBC component of DSGE analysis was non-existent; that the
cross equation constraints derived from fundamentals on which its computational exercises relied
held only for the behaviour of individuals and vanished upon aggregation; and, indeed, that
monetary exchange itself had no inherent rationale in an economy always in equilibrium. None
of these considerations had been seen by its many exponents as reasons to question it.
Could there be stronger evidence than this that the failure of a Keynesian Recovery to take hold
in the 1990s was prompted not by the logical and empirical merits of the matter, but by a
rhetorical case for equilibrium modelling that was persuasive enough to blind the majority of
macroeconomists to its substantive limitations? The presence of all those Ns in the acronyms
used in this essay to label schools of thought should perhaps have given the game away already:
they all stand for “NEW”, whether in English or Greek, a favorite adjective among marketers.
The only cause for wonder, perhaps, is that NKE took as long as it did to inflict real damage on
our economies by blinding policy makers to the significance of two of their most important
features, both already known to be sources of trouble if they misbehaved: namely the financial
19

These same mechanics also imply that, if the real interest rate remains constant, and the central bank wishes to
lower inflation, then the appropriate policy is to lower the nominal interest rate, a proposition nowadays associated
with the policy program known as Neo-Fisherianism. Beyond remarking that its exponents seem to have ignored the
implications of Howitt (1990c,1992), further discussion of this matter is best left for another time and place.
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system, where instability brought on the crisis of 2008-9, and the money supply, whose sudden
explosive growth began in 2020 and triggered the inflation of 2021-2.

IX The Keynesian Recovery Redux?
Peter’s standing in our profession today rests overwhelmingly on his contributions to the theory
of Economic Growth, mainly made in collaboration with Philippe Aghion, and I am not qualified
to discuss these. Philippe and Peter’s first, seminal, paper (Aghion and Howitt 1992) appeared
just as NNCS’s long period of domination over macroeconomic theory and monetary policy was
becoming well entrenched, but this timing did not reflect an acceptance on Peter’s part that the
short-run Keynesian macroeconomics to which he had by then contributed so much was at a
dead end, let alone a loss of confidence in its basic soundness. Peter started collaborating with
Phillipe in the early ‘90s, but he also continued to collaborate with Robert Clower.
In his 1986 review of Klamer (1984), Peter had suggested that part of NCE’s popularity could be
attributed to the fact that it met at least one of Harry Johnson’s (1971) criteria for a successful
intellectual revolution: namely, that it provided a new, but not too new, agenda for younger
researchers to work on, and novel techniques as well, just difficult enough to deter their older
competitors from joining in.20 Peter perhaps noted the lesson implicit here for his own work,
because, not too long after that Keynesian Recovery had failed to materialise in the ‘90s, his
collaboration with Clower would result in a pioneering application to macroeconomics of AgentBased Modelling, a then new approach, but one whose reliance on advanced computational
techniques and deployment of the idea of adaptive learning nevertheless provided it with clear
linkages to certain strands in the mainstream literature.
It is now almost a quarter century since “The Emergence of Economic Organization” (published
in JEBO 2000) got its first conference airing in Ottawa. In this paper, Bob and Peter showed how
the activities of initially independent agents, as they followed rules of thumb in their interactions,
and systematically adapted these in the light of evolving experience, could lead to the evolution
of such entities as specialised shop-keepers, and institutions such as monetary exchange, indeed
of an economic system not unlike the one which Peter had analyzed in his Ph.D. thesis at the
very beginning of his life as a Keynesian.
Since then, further applications of these methods have expanded explosively along paths which,
having retired in 2004, I am not licensed to guide readers. Let me be content, then, with noting
that Peter has contributed to these, helping us to understand, for example, how banks might
function as co-ordinating agents in a monetary economy (see Ashraf, Gerschman and Howitt,
20

In Laidler (2015) I made much of the applicability of Johnson’s analysis to the New Classical Revolution without
citing Howitt (1996). Peter recently and cheerfully accepted my apology for this oversight, even suggesting that it
might have been me who had drawn his attention to Johnson (1971) in the first place. (Personal communication
14/06/2022).
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2017), and, more generally let me affirm that, even as an intellectual day-tripper in this territory,
I can see that an analytic method which puts co-ordination issues at its very center is once again
finding an established place in macroeconomics. Closely related, the last two decades have also
seen Behavioural Economics pile up a mass of empirical evidence showing that, although
economic agents do behave consistently enough to be roughly predictable, the rules they apply to
guide their activities frequently depart from the economically rational.
In the light of these interlinked developments, it can no longer be claimed that forward-looking
maximising behaviour fully co-ordinated in markets that clear is the only academically
respectable basis for macroeconomic theorizing. Models based on this principle are still
defensible as tractable metaphors for the much messier and complex processes and situations that
we all know actually govern real world behaviour. But, but whatever our past views, we must
surely agree that nowadays, Agent Based Modelling and Behavioural Economics, not to mention
the technology that makes them possible, provide a capacity that did not exist three decades ago
for researchers to do things in other ways. And the troubles caused for mainstream
macroeconomics by the recent empirical record of financial crises, recession and now inflation to
be followed by who really knows what, suggests that they might also be able to find a market
among policy makers.
X Conclusion
As his contribution to these proceedings makes clear, Peter Howitt still believes, as he always
has, that though “We do have small models, based on a priori notions of rationality and
equilibrium, that seem to be relevant in some circumstances. . . they are of limited usefulness in
dealing with coordination problems. Equilibrium should be a possible emergent property of a
macro model focussed on coordination problems, not an a priori assumption” (personal
communication 14/06/22) His work in macroeconomics has always been based on this
quintessentially Keynesian view, and his efforts have been vital to keeping it alive through some
very difficult times. If macroeconomics is indeed finally set for a Keynesian Recovery after a
fifty-year hiatus, then this transformation will owe a huge debt to his scientific imagination and
intellectual perseverance.

15

References
Aghion, P and Howitt, P. (1992) A model of growth through creative destruction, Econometrica
60 323-351.
Arrow, K and G. Debreu (1954) Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy,
Econometrica 22 265-90.
Ashraf, Q, B. Gerschman and P. Howitt (2017) Banks, market organization and macroeconomic
performance, an agent based computational analysis Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization, 135 (March) 143-80.
Bailey, M. J. (1962) National Income and the Price Level New York, McGraw Hill.
Barro, R. J. (1978) Unanticipated money, output and the price level in the United States, Journal
of Political Economy 86 (Aug.) 549-81.
-------------- (1979) Second thoughts on Keynesian economics, American Economic Review
(papers and proceedings) 69 (May) 54-9.
----------- and H. Grossman (1971) A general disequilibrium model of income and employment
American Economic Review 61 (March) 82-93.
---------------------------------- (1976) Money, Employment and Inflation New York, CUP.
Boschen J. and H. I Grossman (1981) Tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using
contemporaneous monetary data Journal of Monetary Economics 10 (Nov) 309-33.
Bouey G. (1982) Monetary Policy, Finding a Place to Stand, Washingon D.C., Per Jacobsson
Foundation.
Brunner, K. (1971) A survey of selected issues in monetary theory, Schweizerische Zeitschrift
fuer Volkswirtchaft und Statistik, number 1, 1-146.
-------------- (1983) Has Monetarism failed? Cato Journal 3 (Spring) 23-62.
-------------- (1989) The disarray in macroeconomics in F. Capie and G. E. Wood (eds.)
Monetary Economics in the 1980s London, Macmillan.
-------------- and A. Meltzer (1971) The uses of money: money in the theory of an exchange
economy American Economic Review 61 (Dec.) 784-805.
Clerc. P. (2019) Brunner, Leijonhufvud: friends or foes, European Journal of the History of
Economic Thought 26, 231-270.
----------- (2022) The Pervasive influence of Armen Alchian on Karl Brunner in T. Moser and
M. Savioz (eds.) Karl Brunner and Monetarism Cambridge MA. MIT Press.
----------- and R. Dos Santos de Ferreira (this symposium) Imperfect co-ordination in DSGE
models: the resurgence of Keynes in mainstream macroeconomics.
16

Clower, R. (1965) The Keynesian counter-revolution: a theoretical appraisal, in F.H. Hahn and
F. W. Brechling (eds.) The Theory of Interest Rates London, Macmillan.
------------- (1967) A reconsideration of the microfoundations of monetary theory, Western
Economic Journal 9 (Sept.) 1-9.
Diamond, P. (1982a) Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium, Review of
Economic Studies 49 (april) 217-27.
------------- (1982b) Aggregate demand management in search equilibrium, Journal of Political
Economy 90 (Oct.) 881-94.
Feige, E. and D. Pearce (1976) Economically rational expectations: are innovations in the rate of
inflation independent of innovations in measures of monetary and fiscal policy? Journal of
Political Economy 84 (June) 499-522.
Fischer S. (1977) Long-term contracts, rational expectations and the optimal money supply rule,
Journal of Political Economy 85 (Feb.) 191-206.
Fisher, I. (1933) The debt deflation theory of great depressions, Econometrica 1 (Oct.) 337-57.
Friedman, M. (1968) The role of monetary policy, American Economic Review 58 (March) 1-17.
----------------- (1970) The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Economics London, IEA.
---------------- and Schwartz A. J. (1963) Money and business cycles Review of Economics and
Statistics 45 supplement, (Feb.) 32-64.
Hansen A. (1954) A Guide to Keynes New York, McGraw Hill.
Hicks, J. (1937) Mr Keynes and the classics: a suggested interpretation, Econometrica 5 (April)
145-59.
---------- (1939) Value and Capital Oxford, Clarendon Press.
---------- (1989) A Market Theory of Money Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Howitt P. (1974 Stability and the quantity theory. Journal of Political Economy 82 (Jan.-Feb.)
133-51.
----------- (1978) The limits to stability of a full-employment equilibrium Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 80 (Sept.) 265-82
----------- (1981) Activist monetary policy under rational expectations Journal of Political
Economy 89 (April) 249-69..
------------ (1984) Information and Co-ordination: a review article, Economic Inquiry 22 (July)
429-46.
------------- (1986a) Monetary Policy in Transition: a Study of Bank of Canada Policy, 1982-86
Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute.
17

------------ (1986b) The Keynesian recovery Canadian Journal of Economics 19 (Nov.) 626-41.
------------ (1986c) Conversations with Economists – a review essay Journal of Monetary
Economics 18, 103-18.
------------- (1988) Business cycles with costly research and recruiting Quarterly Journal of
Economics 103 (Feb.) 147-65.
------------- (1990a) The Keynesian Recovery and Other Essays, Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allan.
------------- (1990b) Zero inflation as a long-run target for monetary policy, in R.G. Lipsey (ed.)
Zero Inflation, The Goal of Price Stability, Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute.
------------- (1990c), Wicksell’s cumulative process as non-convergence to rational expectations
equilibrium, London, Ont. UWO, Department of Economics, Research Report 9004.
------------- (1992), Interest rate control and non-convergence to rational expectations equilibrium
Journal of Political Economy 100 (Aug.) 776-800.
------------- (this symposium) Disequilibrated Macroeconomics.
------------- and R. Clower, (2000) The emergence of economic organisation, Journal of
Economic Organisation and Behaviour 41 (Jan.) 55-84.
------------- and P. McAfee (1987) Costly Search and Recruiting, International Economic Review
28 (Feb.) (89-107).
--------------------------------- (1988) Stability of Equilibria with Externalities, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 103 (May) 261-77.
------------ and D. Laidler (1979) Recent Canadian monetary policy – a critique, in R. Wirick and
D. Purvis (eds.) Issues in Canadian Public Policy, Kingston, Queens University.
Johnson, H. G. (1962) Monetary Theory and Policy, American Economic Review 52 (June) 33584.
----------------- (1971) The Keynesian revolution and the Monetarist counter-revolution,
American Economic Review, papers and proceedings 61 (May) 9-22.
Karni E. (1980) A note on Lucas’ equilibrium model of the business cycle, Journal of Political
Economy 88 (Dec.) 1231-36.
Keynes, J. M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money London.
Macmillan.
Kiyotaki, N. and R. Wright (1989) On Money as a Medium of Exchange Journal of Political
Economy 97, 927-954.
Klamer A. (1984) Conversations with Economists, Totowa, N.J. Roman and Allanheld.

18

Kydland F., and E, Prescott Time to build and aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 50, (Sept.)
1345-70.
Laidler D. (1981) Monetarism, an interpretation and an assessment, Economic Journal 91
(March) 1-28.
----------- (1996) Wage and price stickiness in macroeconomics: historical perspective, in F. W.
Capie and G. E. Wood (eds.) Monetary Economics in the 1990s Basongstoke, Macmillan.
------------ (2015) Three revolutions in macroeconomics- their nature and influence, European
Journal of the History of Economic Thought 22 (1).
------------ (2022) Lucas (1972), a personal view from the wrong side of the subsequent fifty
years, London Ontario, UWO Department of Economics working paper 2021-5.
Leijonhufvud A. (1968) On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes, Oxford, OUP.
-------------------- (1973) Effective demand failures, Swedish Economic Journal 1973.
-------------------- (1977) Costs and consequences of inflation, in G. C. Harcourt (ed.), The
Microeconomic Foundations of Macroeconomics, London. Macmillan.
--------------------- (1981) Information and Co-ordination, Oxford, OUP.
Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1972) Expectations and the Neutrality of money, Journal of Economic Theory 4
(Apr.) 103-24.
----------------- (1973) Some international evidence on output-inflation trade-offs, American
Economic Review 63 (June) 326-324.
----------------- (1975) An equilibrium model of the business cycle Journal of Political Economy
83 (Nov-Dec) 1113-44.
----------------- (1976) Econometric policy evaluation, in K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer eds.)
Carnegie Rochester Conference Series 1.
----------------- (1984) Money in a theory of finance, in K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer (eds)
Carnegie Rochester Conference Series 21.
----------------- (2004) Keynote address to the 2003 HOPE conference: My Keynesian education,
History of Political Economy 36 – 5 12-24.
----------------- and T. J. Sargent (1978) After Keynesian Economics in FRB Boston After the
Phillips Curve Boston, Mass.
Minsky, H. (1964) Longer waves in financial arrangements: financial factors in the more severe
depressions, American Economic Review, (papers and proceedings) 54 (May) 324-35.
Patinkin D. (1956) Money, Interest and Prices Evanston, Row Peterson, (2nd ed. (1965), New
York, Harper & Row).

19

--------------- (1984) Keynesian monetary theory and the Cambridge School, in H. G. Johnson
and A. R. Nobay (eds.) Issues in Monetary Economics Oxford, OUP.
Phelps E. (1967) Phillips curves, expectations of inflation and optimal unemployment over time,
Economica N.S. 34, A7g, 254-81.
----------- (1972) Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory: the Cost-Benefit Approach to
Monetary Planning, New York, Norton.
------------ (ed.) (1970) Microfoundations of Employment and Inflation Theory New York,
Norton.
------------ and J. Taylor (1977) Stabilizing powers of monetary policy under rational
expectations Journal of Political Economy 85 (Feb) 163-90.
Samuelson, P. A. (1947) The Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge MA. Harvard
University Press.
Sargent, T. J. (2021) Learning from Lucas, NYU and Hoover Institute, mimeo.
---------------- and N. Wallace (1976) Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2 (May) 169-83.
Tobin J (1981) The monetarist counter-revolution today – an appraisal Economic Journal 91
(March) 29-42.
Woodford M. (2003) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,
Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press.

20

